The Marshall Plan & its Meaning for the US Foreign Policy: The Geopolitical Justification

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I. Explaining the US Geopolitical Narrative
“We can see that our [US] security has been dependent throughout much of our history on the position of Britain … Britain’s position … depended on the maintenance of a balance of power on the European Continent. Thus, it was essential to us, as it was to Britain, that no single Continental land power should come to dominate the entire Eurasian land mass. Our interest has lain rather in the maintenance of some short of stable balance among the powers of the interior, in order that none of them should effect the subjugation of the others, conquer the seafaring fringes of the land mass, become a great sea power as well as land power, shatter the position of England, and enter … on an overseas expansion hostile to ourselves and supported by the immense resources of the interior of Europe and Asia … we have had a stake in the prosperity and independence of the peripheral powers of Europe and Asia … those countries whose gazes were oriented outward, across the seas, rather than inward to the conquest of power on land”
I. US security is based on Britain’s security (London’s fleet “buffers” threats against the American “island”)

II. Britain’s position is based on maintaining a balance of power in Cont. Europe & Asia

III. None Eurasian power (Fr., Ger., Rus., Ch.) should dominate the landmass and its coastland

IV. In such a case, a unified Eurasian power should control the ports, sea-lines and immense sources of Eurasia thus it will become a great naval power

V. Thus, the security of Britain and then of the US will be severely compromised (loss of maritime supremacy / continental outposts / vulnerable to invasion)

VI. Consequently, the US -with Britain- should: (i) Not allow the unification of the continental Europe & Asia under a continental power (ii) Try to keep the Eurasian Coastland states independent of the continental powers and “linked” to them
The Theoretical Underpinnings of the US strategic view: Mackinder’s world

Sir Halford Mackinder ‘s (1861-1947) work: The “founding father” of the modern Anglosaxon geopolitical methodological analysis of International Relations...

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island controls the world.

[Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 106]
Nicholas J. Spykman (1893-1943)

Spykman Geopolitical Map

Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia: Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.
The oversetting of the balance of power in favor of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would be then be in sight. *This might be happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia.* The threat of such an event should, therefore, throw France into alliance with the over-sea powers, and France, Italy, Egypt, India, and Korea would become so many bridge heads where outside navies would support armies to compel the pivot allies to deploy land forces and prevent them from concentrating their whole strength on fleets.

What if the Great Continent, the whole World-Island or a large part of it, were at some future time to become a single and united base of sea-power? ... if we would take the long view, must we not still reckon with the possibility that a large part of the Great Continent might some day be united under a single sway, and that an invisible sea-power might be based upon it? ... Ought we not recognize that is the great ultimate threat to the world’s liberty so far as strategy is concerned, and to provide against it in our new political system?

[Mackinder, Democratic Ideals & Reality, p. 70]
II. Marshal Plan: Economic Arrangements – Political Implications – (Geo)economic/political Outcomes
MP: The Economic Arrangements

➤ The innovative rational of the MP:

- No money donation, but free supply of products based on annual requests of the states following a four-years plan
- The selling of the products in the domestic market would bring capital – denominated on local currency - utilized in ways agreed by the national governments and the US [i.e. use the capital for buying more products or storage it as reserve]
The Marshall Plan Payments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Payment (Million US Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1506</td>
</tr>
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<td>1389</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1079</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>694</td>
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<td>677</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>107</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MP: The Political Implications

- The innovative effects of the MP:
  - Forced the European governments to make long-term planning on their investment needs
  - Forced the European governments to negotiate between each other and between them and the US
  - Forced all the stakeholders in a country to talk and identify their needs and plans
  - Assured that Europe will not drift back to the devastating economic protectionism of the inter-war period
MP: The (Geo)economic/political Outcomes

- **On a country level:** Decisive contribution to the reconstruction and the economic and social welfare (i.e. France: 50% of the public investment program 1948-1952 / Greece: 50% of the country’s GDP in 1950)

- **On a European level:**
  - 1947-1951, European GDP increased by 30%
  - 1949-1951, 80% of the wheat consumed in Europe
  - Profound psychological effects (depart from the heritage of the interwar period)
  - This economic program deterred a deeply political crisis after the war

["The gravest danger for the US security is the possibility of the economic collapse of Western Europe, and the subsequent rise to power of communist elements" CIA Report, April 1947]
MP: The (Geo)economic/political Outcomes

- **On a geopolitical level:**
  - **On the US-European level:** “It is important to remain on friendly hands spaces that have or protecting deposits of minerals or oil and other natural resources, include strategic targets or spaces of strategic importance, they have a significant industrial potential, they acquire a labor force and sizable and organized armed forces, or for political or psychological reasons enable the US exert leverage for the global stability security and peace”  
  
  [Report of an Ad Hoc Committee of the State Department, and the Departments of War and the Navy, April 21, 1947]

  - **On the inter-European level:**
    - Avoid past mistakes: 1919 US contributed loans (pressure for repayment – pressure for war reparations – German economic collapse – rise of the Nazis) – 1947 MP was contribution
    - **German Question:** Economic & political revival of W. Germany (partitioned Germany, not unified) – link/contribution to Frances restructuring (BUT no war reparations)
I. **MP:** Essential part of the introduced “containment” policy against the USSR
   - **Geopolitical Implication:** Not allowing the dominant Eurasian continental power (USSR) to expand to the European coastlands

II. **MP:** Assuring that the major European continental power (Germany) will remain partitioned and controlled, while the European integration project will proceed in a controllable by the US manner
   - **Geopolitical Implication:** Continental Europe will be united under the US control—not under the main continental power and it will be separated by the main Eurasian power (USSR)

III. **MP:** By including both Greece and Turkey in the project it tried to set firm control to a strategically important space of Eastern Europe
   - **Geopolitical Implication:** In the Anaglosaxon geopolitical analysis the specific space is part of the crucial Eastern European territory necessary for the control of the Eurasian landmass

The MP was the essential step for the deployment of comprehensive US strategy based on **Geopolitical Realism & Idealist Rhetoric**
   - **Truman Doctrine** (Gr.-Tur. political assistance, after Iran-Straits-Civil War cases) – **Marshall Plan** (Economic assistance to avoid a political disaster) – **NATO** (military deterrence against the USSR)
«Ούτε μέμφομαι εκείνους που θέλουν να άρχουν, αλλ’ εκείνους που είναι υπερβολικά πρόθυμοι να υποτάσσονται εις άλλους.»
["I am not blaming those who are resolved to rule, only those who show an even greater readiness to submit"]
Ερμοκράτης, 1η Δημηγορία προς Συρακούσιους, 425 π.Χ.)
[Θουκυδίδης, Θουκυδίδου Ιστορίαι, Βιβλίο Δ’, 61, μετάφραση Ελευθερίου Βενζέλου]

ΣΑΣ ΕΥΧΑΡΙΣΤΩ!  
THANK YOU!

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