THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Strategies, Initiatives, Synergies

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London

Paris

EUROPE

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Black Sea

Tangier

Algiers   Tunis

Mediterranean Sea

ALGIERS

MOROCCO

TUNIS

Tripoli

Derna

BARBA

TRIPOLI

COAST

RICA

William Eaton © Hutton Archive / Getty Images

June 2014

European Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)

Maritime domain

All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.

Maritime security

The creation and maintenance of security at sea to facilitate prosperity by encouraging free and unrestricted access to the sea from illegal actions and its use by terrorists, pirates and other criminals.

Involves protection from direct threats to the territorial integrity of a State, such as an armed attack from a military vessel.

Maritime safety

Principally concerned with ensuring **safety of life at sea**, **safety of navigation**, and the protection and preservation of the **marine environment**.

"How important is maritime security? Ask the Greeks!

They faced odds of about three to one at the Battle of Artemisium, the sea side of the Battle of Thermopylae.

They survived, due partly to good luck, and lived to fight another day at the Battle of Salamis, where they defeated the invading Persians for good.

The Greek ability to secure their maritime domain may have saved western civilization as we know it today."

US Department of States

Areas of Interest

- International and national **peace and security**,

- **Sovereignty**, territorial integrity political independence,

- **Sea Lines** of Communications,

- Protection from **crimes at sea**,

- Security of **maritime resources**,

- Access to resources at sea and to the seabed,

- Environmental protection,

- Protection of **seafarers and fishermen**.

THE SPECTRUM OF THREATS

- **Piracy** and **armed robbery** against ships
- **Terrorist acts** involving shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests
- Illicit trafficking in **arms** and **WMD**
- Illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances
- Smuggling and trafficking of **persons** by sea
- Illegal, unreported and unregulated **fishing**
- Intentional and unlawful damage to **marine environment**
- **Cyber threats** for shipping.

PIRACY

According to article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS, piracy is defined as:

"Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b)."

TERRORISM (includes):

- **Attacks or threat** of attacks against

  - **vessels** (warships, cruise liners, tankers and other carriers, tugboats and barges),

  - **harbour** attacks,

  - **fixed land based targets** near ports - oil refineries, oil storage depots,

  - **port infrastructure**, energy **pipelines**, undersea **cables**

- **Hijacking** of commercial/passenger ships on high seas.

  This also includes putting obstructions such as sinking a large ship in choking points in critical sea lanes of communication to disrupt global trade and commerce.

Terrorists can develop effective attack capabilities relatively quickly using a variety of platforms, including:

- **Explosives-**laden suicide boats and light aircraft;

- Merchant and cruise ships as **kinetic weapons** to ram another vessel, warship, port facility, or offshore platform;

- **Commercial vessels as launch platforms** for missile attacks; Missiles can be launched also from land-based launchers and, depending on their capability, have a range of hundreds of miles. However, not all systems are able to target ships and may not have a warhead capable of sinking a large merchant vessel but may cause severe structural damage.

- **Underwater swimmers** to infiltrate ports; and

- **Unmanned** underwater explosive delivery **vehicles**.

- Sea mines are also an effective weapon that can be used by terrorists.

- In addition, terrorists can also take advantage of a **vessel's legitimate cargo**, such as chemicals, petroleum, or liquefied natural gas, as the **explosive component of an attack**. Vessels can be used to transport powerful conventional explosives or WMD for detonation in a port or alongside an offshore facility.

TRAFFICKING BY SEA (1)

Trafficking could distinct in different areas, such as weapons, drugs, persons.

a. Illicit trafficking by sea of small arms and of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons

One of the major threats to maritime security.

UNSC has recognized that the dissemination of illicit small arms and light weapons has hampered the peaceful settlement of disputes, fuelled disputes into armed conflicts and contributed to the prolongation of armed conflicts

TRAFFICKING BY SEA (2)

- *Illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances by sea...*

...poses a **serious threat to maritime security**.

It has been reported that approximately 70% of the total quantity of **drugs** seized is confiscated either during or after transportation by sea.

TRAFFICKING BY SEA (3)

- *Smuggling and trafficking of persons*

  ➢ clandestine immigrants and victims of trafficking

  ➢ who enter countries every year without authorization,

  ➢ including smuggled migrants and victims of trafficking.

MARINE ENVIRONMENT (1)

Intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment can threaten maritime security in a variety of ways.

- loss of marine habitats,

- loss of species and

- reduced fish catch,

- decreased biodiversity,

directly impact the social and economic interests of coastal States.

This can lead to direct conflict, or exacerbate other causes of conflict, such as poverty, migration, infectious diseases, poor governance and declining economic productivity.

MARINE ENVIRONMENT (2)

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU*) fishing*,

➢ because of the food insecurity,

➢ one of the major threats to international peace and security.

Overexploitation of fishery resources remains a major challenge to achieving sustainable fisheries, and thus contributes to food insecurity around the world.

Fishing could also appear as an "unintentional threat" for seafarers, since in some cases fishermen may be armed. This is not uncommon.

MARITIME CYBER SECURITY

E   …merges as the hidden threat to shipping

In the age of cyberspace it is expected to exist a **cyber-security problem** for the maritime domain.

A **cyber-insecurity** on the high seas and ports threatens international shipping.

The problem has been recognized by those responsible for maritime security and has been discussed at conferences and competent authorities.

"Analysis of cyber security aspects in the maritime sector"

(November 2011)

first EU report ever on cyber security challenges in the maritime domain. highlights essential key insights, as well as existing initiatives, as a baseline for cyber security.

According to ENISA's report, cyber threats are a growing menace, spreading to all industry sectors that rely on ICT systems while it finds that **maritime cyber security awareness is currently low, to non-existent**.

EU member states are thus highly recommended to undertake targeted maritime sector awareness raising campaigns and cyber security training of shipping companies, port authorities, national cyber security offices, etc.

ENERGY SECURITY

...is linked directly

...with maritime security.

Control of **energy sources** and **transport routes**

Means of transportation   key element of energy infrastructure protection.

Attacks on energy vessels represent a significant percentage of overall maritime piracy attacks.

Pirate attacks – including those on energy vessels – are cases of **simple robbery at sea**, (pirates boarding and robbing the ship while in port, or from small speedboats while the vessel is underway).

Terrorists ...

There is also a trend in **hijacking** and **kidnapping** for ransom.

OIL TRANSIT CHOKEPOINTS

OIL TRANSIT CHOKEPOINTS
Million barrels moved per day (2009)

PROVED OIL RESERVES
Billion barrels (2010)

COUNTRIES WITH POLITICAL UNREST

DANISH STRAITS 3.6

BOSPORUS 2.9

STRAIT OF HORMUZ 15.5

North America 204.74

Eurasia 98.89

Europe 13.31

Asia & Oceania 40.14

LIBYA

SUEZ CANAL 2

PANAMA CANAL 0.8

Africa 119.11

Middle East 753.36 billion barrels

Central & South America 124.64

BAB EL-MANDAB 3.2

STRAIT OF MALACCA 13.6

MAJOR OIL MOVEMENT in million tones (2005): 1 - 100   101 - 200   201 - 300   > 300

Source: *Reuters, US Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation*

Chokepoints:

critical part of global energy security due to the high volume of oil traded through their narrow straits.

leave oil tankers vulnerable to theft from pirates, terrorist attacks, and political unrest

DEVELOPED countries' share of global seaborne trade is

34% LOADED | **43%** UNLOADED

90% OF GLOBAL TRADE is conducted by sea

DEVELOPING countries' share of global seaborne trade is

60% LOADED | **56%** UNLOADED

8.4 BILLION TONS of goods were loaded aboard ships in 2011.

SECURITY

The end of the Cold War enabled great growth in maritime law concerning security that impacts cargo and merchant vessels.

Article 110 of UNCLOS states that warships of any nation have the right to "approach and visit" merchant vessels suspected of certain crimes of universal jurisdiction, such as **MARITIME PIRACY** and **SLAVE TRAFFICKING.**

1974 SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) CONVENTION involves safety standards for all manner of vessel construction, operation, navigation, communication and management.

APPLIES TO 98% OF WORLD SHIPPING | 162 STATES parties
The attacks of 9/11 prompted a major revision to SOLAS in 2002 called the **International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code.**

International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code

IN FORCE FOR **158 STATES**

Impacts over **99% OF THE WORLD'S MERCHANT-FLEET GROSS TONNAGE** by mandating requirements for security and providing additional deterrence and for evaluating risk.

Provides "maritime domain awareness" by tracking merchant ships using a satellite based Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system or Automatic Identification System (AIS)

2007 study by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

$287,000 per port worldwide | **$105,000** annual running cost, thereafter

UNCLOS offshore zones

Territorial Sea Baseline

Contiguous Zone

Limited enforcement zone

3nm   12nm   24nm   200nm

Sea level

Territorial Sea

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

On water column and underlying CS: Sovereign rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing living and non-living resources. (Art. 55-56)

The High Seas

Water column beyond national jurisdiction

Beyond the line of the outer limits of the CS on the seabed, either shall not exceed 350nm from the territorial sea baseline or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500m isobaths. (Art. 76.5)

State/ Territory Coastal Waters

Sovereignty extends to the air space, water column, seabed and subsoil allowing for the right of innocent passage (Art. 2-8)

Continental Shelf (CS)

The Area

To 200nm inherent sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting non-living resources of seabed and subsoil, plus sedentary species (Art. 76)

Beyond 200nm information shall be submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the CS (Art. 76.8)

No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources. All rights are vested το the Authority (PART XL)

SOVEREIGN TERRITORY	SOVEREIGN RIGHTS TO WATER COLUMN AND CS	SOVEREIGN RIGHTS TO CS	NO NATIONAL RIGHTS (Common heritage of mankind)

International maritime boundaries affects a host of industries that deal with a wide array of activities, such as resource exploration of the seabed, maritime shipping, pollution abatement, commercial fishing, enforcement of immigration and drug tracking laws & more.
International Mapping, "International maritime boundaries, 2013", http://internationalmapping.com

MAP OF PARTIES OF THE UNCLOS

Not ratified by 17 States:

Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iran, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, **Libya**, Liechtenstein, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, United Arab Emirates, and **United States**.

Not signed by 17 States:

Andorra, Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Eritrea, **Israel,** Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Peru, San Marino, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, **Turkey**, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.

The Straits Regime
in International Navigation

Regime of passage through of straits used for international navigation, is defined in the Part III of the UNCLOS (articles 34-45).

Settings applied to straits are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.

GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY, I. Parisis

International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

After 11 Sep 2001,

IMO agreed to develop the *ISPS Code*

- Covers security measures for ships and port facilities

- As an amendment in the *1974 (SOLAS Convention)*.

SOLAS: Safety of Life at Sea Convention

SOLAS is one of the oldest maritime safety conventions,
(first version 1914 following the sinking of the Titanic)

WHAT DOES THE POLAR CODE MEAN FOR SHIP SAFETY?

EQUIPMENT

WINDOWS ON BRIDGE
Means to clear melted ice, freezing rain, snow, mist, spray and condensation

LIFEBOATS
All lifeboats to be partially or totally enclosed type

CLOTHING I
Adequate thermal protection for all persons on board

CLOTHING II
On passenger ships, an immersion suit or a thermal protective aid for each person on board

ICE REMOVAL
Special equipment for ice removal: such as electrical and pneumatic devices, special tools such as axes or wooden clubs

FIRE SAFETY
Extinguishing equipment operable in cold temperatures; protect from ice; suitable for persons wearing bulky and cumbersome cold weather gear

DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION

SHIP CATEGORIES
Three categories of ship which may operate in Polar Waters, based on:
A) medium first-year ice
B) thin first-year ice
C) open waters/ice conditions less severe than A and B

INTACT STABILITY
Sufficient stability in intact condition when subject to ice accretion and the stability calculations must take into account the icing allowance

MATERIALS
Ships intended to operate in low air temperature must be constructed with materials suitable for operation at the ships polar service temperature

STRUCTURE
In ice strengthened ships, the structure of the ship must be able to resist both global and local structural loads

OPERATIONS & MANNING

NAVIGATION
Receive information about ice conditions

CERTIFICATE & MANUAL
Required to have on board a Polar Ship Certificate and the ship's Polar Water Operational Manual

TRAINING
Masters, chief mates and officers in charge of a navigational watch must have completed appropriate basic training (for open-water operations), and advanced training for other waters, including ice

BACKGROUND INFO

❄ THE INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR SHIPS OPERATING IN POLAR WATERS WAS ADOPTED NOVEMBER 2014 BY THE IMO MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE

❄ IT APPLIES TO SHIPS OPERATING IN ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC WATERS

❄ THE AIM IS TO PROVIDE FOR SAFE SHIP OPERATION AND THE PROTECTION OF THE POLAR ENVIRONMENT BY ADDRESSING RISKS PRESENT IN POLAR WATERS AND NOT ADEQUATELY MITIGATED BY OTHER INSTRUMENTS

IMO INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION

European Maritime Spatial Planning

In July 2014, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a legislation to create a common framework for maritime spatial planning in Europe.

The term of *"maritime spatial planning"* refers to a process by which the relevant EU Member State's authorities analyse and organise human activities in marine areas to achieve ecological, economic and social objectives (article 3).

While each EU country will be free to plan its own maritime activities, local, regional and national planning in shared seas would be made more compatible through a set of minimum common requirements.

Security Zones Provided around Offshore Facilities

The legal status of offshore oil and gas installations:

➢ one of the more difficult areas in international law.

➢ may impact on the jurisdiction that states can exercise over offshore installations and

➢ may affect the applicability of certain maritime law principles and rules to offshore installations.

IMO Resolution on *"Safety Zones & Safety of Navigation Around Offshore Installations & Structures:*

….all ships are required to "comply with generally accepted international standards regarding navigation **in the vicinity of artificial islands installations**, structures and safety zones."

Article 60.5 of UNCLOS / 1982:   **500** meters security exclusion zone

However, a 500m safety zone is considered too narrow to protect offshore installations from deliberate attacks particularly from intentional ramming by a large ship.

15nm

5nm

2.5nm

500μ

UNCLOS
safety zone

Exclusion zone

Area to be avoided

Cautionary zone

EU PRIORITY MARITIME REGIONS

A : Arctic

B : Mediterranean & Black Sea

C : Gulf of Guinea

D : Indian Ocean

E : Pacific Ocean

«Η μὲν οὖν Εὐρώπη πολυσχημονεστάτη πασῶν ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ Λιβύη
τἀναντία πέπονθεν, ἡ δὲ Ἀσία μέσην πως ἀμφοῖν ἔχει τὴν διάθεσιν»

Στράβωνος *Γεωγραφικά*, Βιβλίο Β', κεφ. 5, παρ. 18.

Five submarine pipelines connect the south and the north coasts of the Mediterranean basin delivering the Algerian and Libyan natural gas to Europe (Created by the author)

ΑΓΩΓΟΙ ΥΠΟΣΤΗΡΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΑΠΟ :

— Ρωσία
— Ρωσία και Τουρκία
— ΕΕ και ΗΠΑ
— Ελλάδα – Κύπρο – Ισραήλ – ΕΕ (υπό μελέτη)

■ Διυλιστήρια

— Παλαιότεροι αγωγοί πετρελαίου και αερίου

······ Υποθαλάσσιοι αγωγοί αερίου

Maritime Silk Road initiative
Silk Road Economic Belt

According to Reuters calculations, China's state-backed firms have already invested at least $5 billion in transport infrastructure over the past decade.

BELGIUM Antwerp — At least $3.94 million

•Cosco Pacific bought a 25% stake in 2004. China Merchants later got a stake through its part-purchase of Terminal Link. The two now have a 29% interest in Antwerp.

GREECE Piraeus Port — At least $624 million

•Cosco Pacific, for the right to run and upgrade part of the port.

DJIBOUTI Port of Djibouti — $185 million

•China Merchants, for a 23.5% stake

KENYA Lamu Port — Mombasa port $484 million / $66.7 million

•China Road & Bridge
•China Communications Construction Company

Pakistan Gwadar port — $198 million

•China paid for 80% of the port's Phase I

SRI LANKA Hambantota port — At least $1.9 billion
Colombo Port City $1.43 billion
Colombo Port $500 million

•China Exim Bank
•China Harbour Engineering
•China Communications Construction Company
•China Development Bank

CHINA'S RAILWAY, INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING

■ LEFT AXIS: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
As a percent of GDP

— RIGHT AXIS: RAILWAY TRANSPORT FIXED ASSET INVESTMENT
Accummulated growth rate, percent

China, already at the centre of world trade, plans to spend billions of euro to revive intercontinental land routes and develop maritime links to expand commerce and give it more weight in a freight system dominated by European shipping lines. (Nov. 2014)

Sources: World Bank, National Bureau of Statistics of China; Reuters

2/10/2015

The Maritime Dimension of European Security

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Maritime security operations (MSO)

Measures performed by the appropriate civilian or military authorities and multinational agencies….

…to counter the threat and mitigate the risks of illegal or threatening activities in the maritime domain,…

…so that they may be acted upon in order to enforce law, protect citizens and safeguard national and international interests.

Expansion of pirate attacks (2005-2011)
in the region of the Horn of Africa

# International Maritime Bureau (IMB) piracy report 2007-2012

Western Africa
Eastern Africa / Indian Sub Continent
Southeast Asia
Pirate Incidents 2007- 2012
Major Shipping Routes

2012 - Pirate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea

NAMFI

Μόνη Κυρίας των Αγγέλων Αγίου Ιωάννου Ερημι

Σταυρός

Χωραφάκια

Μόνη Αγίας Τριάδος των Τζαγκαρόλων

Χωρδάκι

Κουνουπιδιανά

Περβολίτσα

Παζινος

Πιθάρι

Chania

NMIOTC

Naval Base

Σούδα

Naval Base

Souda Bay

Τσικαλαριά

Απτέρα

Maritime security initiatives in EU

The lead EU institution responsible for the security of the external borders of the Union is the **FRONTEX**, the European Agency for the management and operational cooperation of the external borders.

In this context, a Blue Book was adopted October 2007 - the *Integrated Maritime Policy for the EU - as political initiative and a maritime dimension of all relevant efforts,* aimed at uniting the various approaches.

This policy seeks to integrate the maritime affairs among national, regional and EU institutions to maintain surveillance and better manage maritime space.

Critical Maritime Routes Programme (CMR)

CMR programme aims at strengthening regional and national maritime security capabilities, and at enforcing the rules and provisions which guarantee the security of navigation and other activities at sea. It focus on coast guard, maritime law enforcement with a coast guard function and/or other maritime authorities of selected countries, notably where the threat has appeared more recently and the gap in capacity is high.

The activities in the framework of CMR programme include five projects, which contribute in creating trans-regional synergies and increasing maritime security and safety of critical maritime routes:

1) *CMR Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism (CRIMSON)*:

2) *CMR Indian Ocean (CRIMARIO)*:

3) *CMR Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO)*:

4) *CMR Western Indian Ocean:*
   - *Law enforcement capacity building in East Africa (CRIMLEA)*:
   - *Enhancing maritime security and safety through information sharing and capacity building (MARSIC)*:

Chiefs of the European Navies (CHENS)
Navies Maritime Operational Concept

contextual basis for European Navies' military activity in the maritime environment.

common Maritime Operational Concept

maritime safety and security has always been paramount for the global development and prosperity but today the key differences are that new and emerging challenges have to be met. These challenges include:

- The wide array of threats to the significant volume of sea travelled trade.

- The potential damages which can be done on a nations territory by a threat from the sea;

- The opportunities that can be found on exploiting ocean resources;

- The possibilities of developing new sea routes north of America and Asia.

Modern navies can ensure the States national security and sovereignty at sea,

European navies provide an increasingly essential contribution to national and transnational strategies.

contribution to deterrence, security, safety and stability of the global maritime domain.

The CHENS's Maritime Operational Concept identifies four roles as the possible naval activities within the maritime security spectrum: (a) **Maritime Defence**, (b) **Maritime Security Operations**, (c) **Crisis Response Operations,** (d) **Naval Diplomacy.**

Alliance Maritime Strategy

launched by NATO in 2011 (AMS 2011) sets out,

in full consistency with the Strategic Concept of the Alliance,

- **the ways** that maritime power could help resolve critical challenges facing the Alliance now and in the future, and

- **the role**s - enduring and new - that NATO forces may have to carry out in the maritime environment in order to contribute to the Alliance's defence and security and to promote its values.

Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM)

NATO central command of all its maritime forces,

Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM)

Northwood (UK) ------- Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons (Belgium).

Its commander is the prime maritime advisor to the Alliance.

MARCOM is responsible for planning and conducting all NATO maritime operations and to ensure it is capable at all times of contributing to potential maritime operations. This requires the highest level of readiness, of awareness of the maritime environment and it also requires the HQ to maintain a constant dialogue with key maritime stakeholders.

European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)

It is based on four guiding principles:

a. The c*ross-sectoral approach*, which means all partners from civilian and military authorities and actors need to cooperate better, respecting each other's internal organization.

b. *The functional integrity*, in the sense that it does not affect the respective competences of the Union and its Member States in the areas covered.

c. *The respect for rules and principles*, such as the international law, human rights and democracy.

d. *The maritime multilateralism*, in the sense of cooperation with all relevant international partners and organisations.

"cross-sectoral" : actions or cooperation between different marine or maritime functions.

European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)

Four main strategic objectives:

a.   Make best use of existing capabilities at national and European level

b.   Promote effective and credible partnerships in the global maritime do-main

c.   Promote cost efficiency

d.   Enhance solidarity among Member States

The EUMSS covers both

the internal and external aspects of the Union's maritime security.

It serves as comprehensive framework, contributing to a stable and secure global maritime domain, in accordance with the ESS,

ensuring coherence with EU policies, in particular the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), and the Internal Security Strategy (ISS)

The Action Plan for EUMSS

Jointly implemented at European and national level, contains 130 actions organized in five key areas of work:

a. *Intensifying EU external action*: A better use of the tools at the EU's disposal, including strengthened political dialogue and development aid.

b. *Shared maritime awareness and surveillance*: Focus on developing a common information sharing environment.

c. *Capability development reinforced*: For instance by promoting dual-use technologies.

d. *Working towards a common risk analysis*: Risk management, protection of critical maritime infrastructure and crisis response will be bolstered

e. *Strengthening maritime security research and training*

The Maritime Dimension of European Security

The Polar Circle

Greenland (Denmark)

Canada

U.S.A.

North Pole

Mendeleyev Ridge

Lomonosov Ridge

Russia

200-mile zone   **Canada**   **Iceland**   **U.S.A.***

Russia   **Norway**   **Denmark**

The Maritime Dimension of European Security

Maritime security is important for exploiting maritime resources, securing livelihoods and development.

It should, however, be framed within national and regional policy that goes beyond immediate needs and reactive engagement.

Such an integrated strategy includes environmental protection, management of fish stocks, tourism and the transport needs of landlocked countries.

Neglect could result in acute security challenges in the future.

The adoption of the **EU Maritime Security Strategy** ensure an integrated and comprehensive approach, with particular emphasis on threats, risks, challenges and opportunities that exist in the sea.

The EUMSS not seek to create new structures, programmes or legislation, but strives to build upon and strengthen existing achievements and existing EU policies.